Russia’s Wagner Group has reportedly had a growing presence in the Central African Republic (CAR) since 2017. Although it officially denies this, if the numerous reports of its actions in the country are correct, Wagner and Russia have substantial financial incentive to remain in the country for the long term. Moreover, through a high level of engagement with the government in Bangui as well as with media and civil society in the country, Russia is helping to shape a new narrative for engagement with Africa that stands in direct opposition to the West and its commercial interests.
The Emerging Conflict: 2013–2017
The current conflict in the CAR began with the rise of the now-dissolved Séléka collective of rebels on December 10, 2012, and resulted in the ouster of President François Bozizé on March 24, 2013. This resulted in the forming of an alliance between various Bozizé-aligned militant groups to form the Coalition of Patriots for Change (CPC) in opposition to the government led by current President Faustin-Archange Touadéra. The ensuing civil conflict has involved opposition insurgent groups, organized crime networks, and foreign state actors, resulting in rampant corruption, ethnic conflict, and numerous human rights abuses by all sides.
The CPC is comprised of a broad range of opposition groups that include the Anti-Balaka collective, the Central African Republic Patriotic Movement (MPC), the Return, Reclamation and Rehabilitation Group (3R), and the Popular Front for the Renaissance of the Central African Republic (FPRC). Although initially aligned with the CPC, the Union For Peace In The Central African Republic (UPC) has since withdrawn its support. The CAR is also home to other non-CPC-aligned rebel groups such as the relatively weak Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) and the Democratic Front of the Central African Republic (FDPC). These opposition groups fund themselves through a mixture of local tax collection and mineral resource exploitation and trafficking. The means by which this is achieved include roadblock fee collection, the timber trade, poaching, the illicit ivory trade, and more. It is unknown whether any of these groups are receiving backing from foreign states or organizations.
In addition to clashes between CAR Armed Forces, the CPC, and other rebel groups, various foreign actors have been present in the ongoing conflict. These have included the military personnel involved in the MINUSCA United Nations (UN) peacekeeping mission, the Rwandan Armed Forces, and more recently, the Russian Wagner Group. French and South African forces have also assisted the CAR government against rebels in the past but have since withdrawn. The CAR government continues to receive funding for its counter-insurgency operations (COIN) from the UN and various international bodies.
Wagner’s Growing Presence
In December 2017, Russia passed a UN Security Council motion to allow the CAR to bypass international sanctions, permitting the central government to procure Russian weaponry and allow Russian trainers to aid its forces in COIN operations. In January 2018, Russia sent 170 civilian trainers alongside five uniformed ones, who began training CAR forces and the presidential guard. The Russian civilian trainers were later shown to be working for a CAR-based firm called Sewa Security Services, which the US State Department claimed is a “CAR-based security company controlled by the Wagner Group” in a January 2023 press release.
There are numerous sources that indicate a strong relationship between the Russian state and Wagner in its operations in the CAR. Leaked documents obtained by the Khodovorsky-funded Dossier Center indicate that Wagner actively coordinated its activities in Africa (including the CAR) with senior officials inside the Russian Foreign and Defence Ministries.
In 2019, Russia worked with the UN and the African Union (AU) toward the signing of the Khartoum Agreement, a peace deal involving the CAR government and 14 armed groups operating within the country. However, the agreement was broken when CPC fighters launched attacks on the capital to disrupt the 2020 presidential election in retribution for François Bozizé’s name being excluded from the ballot. Wagner, alongside Rwandan, MINUSCA, and CAR forces, successfully repelled these attacks. Wagner then participated in successful counter-offensives ordered by re-elected President Touadéra against rebel areas shortly thereafter, resulting in an end to the rebel blockade. On March 30 of that year, just prior Touadéra’s re-inauguration, Russian ambassador Vladimir Titorenko stated that Bozizé and the rebel groups would “absolutely be eliminated in military operations,” should their war against the government persist. According to the International Crisis Group (ICG), this was well received by many Central Africans, “who hailed the Russian mercenaries as liberators”.
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Wagner is apparently popular within the CAR capital where there have been pro-Russia rallies and even a statue erected in praise of Wagner’s involvement. Moreover, Russian nationals have become a visible part of the Touadéra regime. These include Valery Zakharov, who previously served in the Federal Security Service (FSB) and now reportedly serves as Touadéra’s national security advisor, chief bodyguard, and was an alleged negotiator in the Khartoum agreements. Zakharov also reportedly maintains an office within the presidential palace and the European Union claims that he is "a key figure in the Wagner Group's command structure and keeps close links with the Russian authorities". Other prominent Russian nationals with alleged close ties to the regime include Evgeny Khodotov, Oleg Polguev, and Dmitry Syty.
Despite Russia’s apparent warm reception in the capital, Wagner has been accused of multiple documented and alleged abuses in the CAR that include extrajudicial killings, the murder of journalists (allegedly including three Russian investigative journalists) and humanitarian workers, kidnap, rape, and attacks on civilians working in rebel-held mining sites. These alleged atrocities have not only been committed by Russian nationals working for Wagner, but also reportedly by Syrian nationals that have been recruited by the company.
Attack on Dmitry Syty and the Role of Minerals in the Conflict
On December 16, 2022, Russian national Dmitry Syty was seriously injured and later hospitalized in a parcel bomb in addressed to him in Bangui. Much about this attack remains a mystery, including the extent of Syty’s injuries. Wagner Chief Yevgeny Prigozhin has been vocal in his condemnation of France as the perpetrator, claiming that Syty received threats from French agents in the past. French Foreign Minister Catherine Colonna has denied her country’s involvement in the matter. Although this is not the first time Prigozhin has stoked anti-colonial sentiments against France in Africa, it is well documented that Paris is unhappy with Russia’s involvement in the CAR.
The CAR is home to rich mineral reserves that include diamonds, gold, copper, iron, uranium, and many others. Prior to the country’s civil war and France’s subsequent withdrawal of support for the government in 2021, most of the mineral rights in the CAR were controlled by French interests. In one example found in documents released on Wikileaks in 2016, the French nuclear energy giant Areva was accused of “failing to ensure the welfare of local employees, particularly in protecting miners from high levels of radiation”. Although the loss of these lucrative mineral contracts would certainly be cause for concern among policymakers in Paris, it is unclear whether France or agents acting on its behalf were in any way involved in the Syty attack.
Although Syty’s official role in the CAR is to act as the head of Russia House, which is ostensibly a Russian cultural center that operates in Bangui, it is alleged that his involvement on the ground has been much more extensive. For this reason, he was placed under sanctions by the US Treasury in September 2020. A December 6, 2022 report from the French-led initiative All Eyes on Wagner alleges that Wagner is engaged in the export of CAR diamonds through a secretly controlled firm named Diamville. Founded in 2019 by Patrick Setem Bonguende, a man the report alleges works as a driver on behalf of Syty, Diamville is reportedly heavily engaged in extortion within the CAR diamond trade. This reportedly includes forcing local diamond dealers to sell exclusively to Diamville or risk violent reprisals, including assassinations. If the allegations of the EIC-All Eyes on Wagner report are to be believed, Syty could have enemies in Bangui who could also seek to eliminate him.
Although the perpetrator or perpetrators of the December attack on Syty may never be known, the incident highlights the important role that minerals play at the center of the ongoing conflict in the CAR. Reports also allege that Wagner is engaging in the direct plunder of artisanal gold and diamond mines across the country. Witnesses from allegedly attacked mining sites, who have since fled to neighboring Sudan, described indiscriminate attacks by Wagner operatives arriving in armored vehicles and helicopters in interviews with the Guardian this past summer. Pauline Bax, Africa director of the International Crisis Group claims that “There are regular reports of attackers arriving by helicopter, killing artisanal goldminers and rebels … [then] taking everything they can and then leaving… Sometimes they come back again a month or so later and do the same thing. It is nothing to do with securing a mining site”. One US diplomatic cable claimed that Wagner may have seen its mineral profits from the country reach US $1 billion in 2022. The cable also alleges that Wagner has invested heavily in a gold mine in Bambari in the center of the country, turning it from an artisanal operation into a large complex.
CAR diamonds account for less than 1% of the diamonds that pass through Antwerp annually and the sale of conflict diamonds is strictly prohibited by the Tiffany Accord; however, the De Standaard investigation alleges that many of those mined in the CAR have passed through neighboring Sudan and Cameroon. Moreover, although there is no direct evidence to implicate Russia in the illegal sale of conflict diamonds from the CAR, Russia’s total diamond exports were up in 2022 according to official Kimberly Process Statistics. Despite global diamond sales being generally up during this time due to favorable prices, if allegations against Wagner are correct, Russia could potentially mix imported CAR conflict diamonds into its own rough diamond exports or sell CAR diamonds through intermediaries neighboring African countries.
Analysis: What can be Learned from Wagner’s Role in the CAR
Wagner’s efforts to control the mineral trade in the CAR are nothing new in sub-Saharan African warfare. In instances of civil war, it is typically the side that dominates the country’s natural resources that wins. Moreover, it is typical that the side that controls the most liquid of commodities wins the war: this was the case in the 1975 – 2002 Angolan Civil War where the oil-backed MLPA came to overpower the diamond-backed UNITA. In this way, Wagner has adapted practically to the context of African warfare in a manner that Western actors have often not, such as when the West tacitly backed Angola’s UNITA despite its inability to control the country’s more lucrative oil reserves. With the West now ostensibly taking a hands-off approach to the ongoing conflict in the CAR, Russia and Wagner appear to be a more reliable partner to the government in Bangui than Western governments and institutions.
Russia has also proven capable of projecting soft power and adapting to local politics in Africa in ways that Western countries have not. This can be seen in the extensive proliferation of pro-Russian and anti-Western social media content across the Sahel region. Russia also reportedly works through traditional media in the region with reports indicating that the Russian embassy in Bangui fully funds at least one local radio station in the country. Although Russia certainly benefits from both the legacy of the Soviet Union’s previous support for various groups and the fact that it was not a colonial power in Africa, the relative aloofness of Western countries to African political affairs coupled with the mixed results of their military endeavors certainly bolster Russia’s image at present.
It appears that Wagner’s role in the CAR civil war was a carefully coordinated endeavor on the part of the Russian state that began with the 2017 resolution by the UN Security Council. If the reports are to be believed, there is much financial incentive for Russia’s involvement, especially as the country deals with heavy sanctions amid the ongoing war in Ukraine. Despite these allegedly nefarious dealings, Russia appears to be gaining the upper hand over the West in terms of its image in the CAR. Although this is likely in large part due to the extensiveness of its media campaign, the history of Western colonialism also likely plays a role in bolstering the emerging pro-Russian narrative. Moreover, although Russia has been extensively accused of abusive practices in the CAR’s mineral trade, Western companies operating in Africa also do not enjoy a sterling track record in this regard.
Wagner: An End in sight?
Although Russia appears to have an upper hand compared to the West as a reliable partner for the Central African government, some doubt the sustainability of this role. In an interview with the Taipei Times, ICG Africa Director Enrica Picco cast doubts over Wagner’s ability to control mineral assets in the country. “They [Wagner] don’t fully control all the mining sites, and there is still fighting at several. The group’s move [into frontier zones] changed the conflict dynamics because the rebel factions there united in the face of the common enemy to protect their mining revenues,” she said. In a recent interview with Al-Jazeera, African Programme Director for the London-based Royal Institute for Foreign Affairs Alex Vines stated, “they [Wagner] are not getting a good return on investment other than some individuals profiting from access to resources they got in return for their services.” US-based Geopolitical Strategist Peter Zeihan has also stated that 2023 will be “Wagner’s last year”, pointing to heavy casualties sustained by the group in its various operations and a growing lack of available recruits amid Russia’s ongoing war in Ukraine and the country’s demographic challenges.
However, Wagner appears committed to its CAR cause despite recent heavy casualties and, if reports are to be believed, its recruitment of Syrian fighters may bode well for the company’s ability to attract local talent into its ranks. Moreover, although Russia’s alleged proceeds from this war are only going into the hands of a relative few, the ongoing sanctions against Russia likely have Moscow looking for sources of foreign currency wherever it can find them.
A Game-Changer Either Way
The heavy use of words such as ‘allegedly’ and ‘reportedly’ speak to the opaqueness of Russia’s involvement in the CAR civil war. Although Wagner’s tactical success is questionable, Russia’s ability to directly engage with the Bangui regime while promoting a pro-Kremlin narrative across Africa stands in stark contrast to decades of Western policy in the region. In this way, what is clear is that by working in close proximity with semi-private mercenary groups and local stakeholders, countries can gain access to valuable resources for prolonged periods of time. Given Africa’s tendency toward instability and substantial mineral reserves, this could change the way in which global actors engage with Africa for years to come.
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This is great. What do you think about Syty's recent return to CAR?
Excellent read/listen! Keep up the fantastic work.