Belgian authorities recently disrupted a jihadist plot in Antwerp that involved the use of kamikaze drones – a disturbing evolution in terrorist tactics. The operation led to the arrest of two suspects who aimed to target Prime Minister Bart De Wever, among other politicians. Dutch far-right politician Geert Wilders, also reportedly on the hit list, suspended his election campaigning activities due to security concerns. Evidence uncovered so far in the investigation includes explosives resembling an IED, evidence of intent to weaponize a drone, and a 3D printer, which the suspects may have used to manufacture drone parts for delivering explosive payloads. The case highlights the growing threat posed by the convergence of advanced commercially available technologies within terrorist agendas, compounded by increasingly low barriers to accessing technical know-how and an online propaganda ecosystem saturated with do-it-yourself manuals. Investigations into the digital footprint of the two plotters showcased searches on drone weaponization and messages on Threema, an encrypted messaging application which has become popular with various Salafi-Jihadist groups. This development marks a significant shift in how terrorists employ advanced tools, reinforcing the urgent need for heightened vigilance and strategic responses to this emerging threat. While experts have warned that the rapid pace of drone innovation stemming from the Russia-Ukraine war is bound to enhance the operational capabilities of violent extremist actors, the most immediate concern is the proliferation of easily accessible instructional manuals on drone weaponization and deployment in DIY format that are just clicks away, accompanied by Islamic State (IS) and al-Qaeda propaganda explicitly calling for such attacks. Immediate action is needed to disrupt this vector: allocate additional resources to disrupt terrorist use of the internet (TUI) and improve content takedown processes across small and large platforms.
The disrupted plot in Belgium stands out for what appears to be the use of a 3D printer to facilitate drone weaponization. This is the second publicly disclosed incident in which 3D printers appear to be used to weaponize drones by Salafi-Jihadist perpetrators in the West. In September 2023, Mohamad al-Bared, a PhD student in engineering from Coventry, was convicted of preparing acts of terrorism. Authorities discovered a prototype “kamikaze” fixed-wing drone at his residence, which he had engineered and partially 3D printed. Prosecutors asserted that this device was meant to carry an explosive or chemical warhead for IS. Investigations revealed design files, weekly encrypted communications with IS contacts, and notebooks detailing chemical-weapon formulas.
While details are still emerging, the 3D printer appears to have been used to fabricate components intended to weaponize drones for attacks on Dutch and Belgian politicians. All of these points point towards a continuing escalation in technological diffusion that is steadily lowering the barriers to attack for terrorist groups and the individuals they inspire or direct in the West. The commercialization of drones, falling prices, and more user-friendly models now intersect with increasing affordability and commercial availability of 3D printers, effectively allowing terrorists and violent extremists to design and manufacture custom parts from home that enable commercially available drones to carry payloads, bypassing oversight. The threat stems from an ecosystem of off-the-shelf tools, community guides, and step-by-step manuals and tutorials that enable non-specialist actors to use them effectively. In recent years, both Islamic State and al-Qaeda have published instructional manuals on the use of drones and propaganda encouraging drone attacks on soft targets in the West. This uptick in propaganda comes at a time of surging incidents of political violence and assassination plots in Europe, Central Asia, and the Middle East, in which drones are increasingly involved.
In October 2023, al-Qaeda’s as-Sahab Media Foundation commended Hamas following the October 7 terrorist attack and called upon followers to execute attacks targeting embassies and military bases. They encouraged supporters to utilize their skills to create homemade explosives, deploy drones, or engage in other forms of attacks. Moreover, the Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP), IS’s Afghanistan-Pakistan branch, and online pro-IS networks have been ramping up their propaganda and strategic initiatives around the use of drones, particularly in targeting high-profile events. Following threats in the wake of the March 2024 Crocus City Hall attack in Moscow, phrases like “if they constrict you on the ground, then strike them from the sky” encapsulate their intent to leverage aerial capabilities to circumvent counterterrorism (CT) pressure. Propaganda also encourages drone attacks on specific events. In 2024, the pro-IS outlet Al Adiyat issued threats against the Paris Olympics in a graphic depicting a drone carrying munitions toward the Eiffel Tower. Pro-IS online supporters increasingly underscore the utility of “kitchen-made bombs” and “commercial drones,” indicating a shift towards more accessible terrorist tools. Accompanying this is their “Modern Warfare” drone manual series, spanning six issues, which provides comprehensive instructions on employing drones in attacks. This blend of propaganda and pragmatic guidance marks a sophisticated evolution in their tactical repertoire, posing an increased threat to international security, particularly at large public gatherings.
Terrorist groups have long leveraged drone technology to enhance their operational capabilities in conflict theaters. In the early 2000s, Iran-sponsored proxies, including Hamas, Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ), and Hezbollah, tested drones for surveillance and propaganda purposes but were heavily reliant on Iranian-supplied systems and did not conduct operations with immediate battlefield impact. It was IS in 2014 that seized upon the increasing commercial availability of drones to systematically operationalize them for surveillance, propaganda, and attacks. This period was marked by rapid innovation in drone terrorism with IS establishing dedicated units that weaponized drone systems and integrated them into combat operations, dropping mortar shells on targets in Iraq and Syria. The weaponization of civilian drones spread as a terrorist tactic globally, with terrorist groups, from the Houthis to JNIM, increasingly coordinating drone attacks with ground maneuvers. Later, the advent of first-person-view drones enabled ‘kamikaze’ attacks in which rather than dropping ammunition, drones fly into the designated target and trigger an explosion, further exploiting the aperture between evolving commercially available tools and CT efforts.
No successful jihadist-inspired drone attacks have occurred in Western countries, despite hundreds of such attacks in global conflict zones in recent years. Nonetheless, this does not indicate a lack of interest in using drones for external operations (EXOPS). Multiple directed, facilitated, and inspired plots in the United States and Europe have been disrupted, which involved drone technology. Other thwarted cases have shown Europe-based individuals procuring drones on behalf of terrorist groups operating in the Middle East. In the U.S. context, the first plot involved Rezwan Ferdaus, a physics graduate student at Northeastern University inspired by al-Qaeda, who planned to attack the Pentagon and U.S. Capitol using a remote-controlled aircraft filled with explosives in 2011. Since then, there have been a host of disrupted plots in the U.S. involving drones. In 2017, an Army Sergeant First Class stationed in Hawaii self-radicalized and purchased a drone he passed on to FBI agents he believed were IS operatives, intending them to be used to track U.S. troop movements in the Middle East. In Michigan, a self-described ‘son of the Islamic State,’ who had attempted to travel to Syria to join the group twice, gathered drones and built bombs over a multi-year period. He was arrested in 2017 after he pledged allegiance to IS. In May of this year, a 19-year-old former member of the Michigan Army National Guard radicalized by IS was arrested on the day he planned to carry out a mass shooting at a military base, which he had monitored with a drone to scout vehicle entry and exit points.
In Europe, the past five years have seen a surge in jihadist plots leveraging drones. In April 2020, German authorities arrested members of a Tajik IS cell that were plotting to attack the U.S. Air Base Spangdahlem and the NATO AWACS Air Base. The plot featured remote-controlled drones and paragliders armed with explosives to attack the bases. The members of the IS cell had downloaded guides from an IS Telegram channel that provided detailed instructions on how to drop munitions from drones. In 2017, in Denmark, multiple arrests were made of individuals who had bought drones for IS, a part of the international supply chain, by the Bangladeshi Sujan brothers. Materials shipped to IS included drone components and infrared cameras. In 2022, a Moroccan national was arrested by Spanish authorities for planning an IS-directed drone attack on the Camp Nou stadium during a soccer match, after he had rapidly radicalized during the COVID-19 lockdown. In March of this year, French authorities charged a 22-year-old who had previously spent one year in IS-controlled territory in Syria and Iraq with preparing a terrorist attack using a modified drone. He had already acquired the drone and researched online how to modify it, while remaining in contact with an IS recruiter on Telegram.
An emerging trend that is equally concerning in the European context is the leveraging of organized crime networks by terrorist organizations to procure drones. In 2023, Danish authorities discovered that individuals linked to the gang “Loyal to Familia” purchased drones online capable of carrying 30-kilogram payloads, intended for use by Hamas in terrorist attacks at an “unknown location in Denmark or abroad.” Investigations revealed the gang members were taking orders from Hamas leaders in Lebanon. A Europe-wide operation in 2024 and 2025 that spanned Spain, Germany, France, and the UK dismantled a Hezbollah logistics network for drone procurement that included multiple individuals who were also charged with membership in a criminal organization. Efforts to disrupt terrorist use of the internet (TUI) to prevent attacks cannot be separated from efforts to target the online platforms where terrorist and criminal actors converge or coordinate.
IS propaganda and recent disrupted drone plots show that militants regard military, civilian, and symbolic political sites as attractive targets. While plots tend to maximize for publicity and subsequent psychological impact, more strategic assets may be targeted in the future. As recent suspected Russian incursions into European airspace have shown, drone sightings around airports can force runway closures and have major cascading effects on air traffic and safety. Targeting of aviation infrastructure, including control towers, is another way that terrorists may seek to maximize impact. Similarly, critical infrastructure, including electrical substations and water treatment plants, and transportation nodes, may be selected to increase impact beyond the immediate target. At this point, large public gatherings and soft targets remain of primary concern, with IS having put out multiple propaganda items over the past year encouraging attacks on sporting events, including the 2024 Summer Olympics in France. In that case, multiple terrorist plots were disrupted, and over 3,570 people were excluded from participation in the event due to security concerns. Upcoming events such as the 2026 FIFA World Cup, to be held in Canada, Mexico, and the United States, combine high casualty potential and high publicity value.
The most urgent step to disrupt the evolving jihadist drone-terrorism threat to the West is to limit access to openly available content that shows how to convert commercial drones into weapons. This is not the only response needed — counter-drone capabilities and supply chain disruption matter — but a priority should be making manuals and instructional material harder to find and dedicating more resources to curbing their circulation. The emerging signals of crime-terror cooperation for the acquisition of coveted technologies reinforce the need for a strategy that recognizes hybrid threats: monitoring individual threat types is no longer sufficient. Policymakers and analysts should track evolving actor networks, hybrid partnerships, and shared infrastructures to close the systemic gaps these groups exploit.
 | A guest post by
|